WASHINGTON -- In an assessment that differs sharply with his view today, Dick Cheney more than a decade ago defended the decision to leave Saddam Hussein in power after the first Gulf War, telling a Seattle audience that capturing Saddam wouldn't be worth additional U.S. casualties or the risk of getting "bogged down in the problems of trying to take over and govern Iraq."

Cheney, who was secretary of defense at the time, made the observations answering audience questions after a speech to the Discovery Institute in August 1992, nearly 18 months after U.S. forces routed the Iraqi army and liberated Kuwait.
Seattle Post Intelligencer, published 09-29-2004

The Rendon Group has taken in a great deal of cash vilifying Saddam Hussein. In 1991, following the Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush signed a presidential order directing the CIA to launch a covert operation to undermine the Iraqi leader. The CIA, in turn, passed along a sizable amount of money to The Rendon Group to turn world opinion against Hussein.

One of the company's first actions was to create the Iraqi National Congress, a name they came up with, as a Hussein opposition group; and in October 1992, Rendon protege Ahmed Chalabi was placed in charge of the group....
James Bamford, A Pretext for War, p. 296, published 06-08-2004

In fact, if the intelligence George W. was given was correct, he might have lost nearly his entire immediate family, including his father, mother, wife, and two brothers. Just as he sought to avenge his father's political loss, he would one day go after the man accused of attempting to murder his father and the rest of the family. "After all," he would later comment, when speaking of the Iraqi leader at a Houston fundraiser, "this is the guy who tried to kill my dad."

...As the giant plane took off from Houston's Ellington Field on April 14, the only passengers were former President Bush, his wife Barbara, their two sons Marvin and Neil, his wife Sharon, and Laura Bush. Her husband, George W. Bush, who had always avoided foreign travel, stayed home to oversee his interest in the Texas Rangers baseball team and to make preparations for his run for the governorship.
James Bamford, A Pretext for War, p. 255, published 06-08-2004

In November of 1993, Ahmad Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress, an opposition group devoted to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, presented the Clinton Administration with a detailed, four-phase war plan entitled "The End Game," along with an urgent plea for money to finance it. "The time for the plan is now," Chalabi wrote. "Iraq is on the verge of spontaneous combustion. It only needs a trigger to set off a chain of events that will lead to the overthrow of Saddam." It was a message that Chalabi would repeat for the next eight years.
The New Yorker, published 12-17-2001

In March, 1995, Chalabi's insurrection was launched, and failed dramatically. "There was nothing there," Baer told me. "No one moved except one Kurdish leader acting on his own—three days too late. Nothing happened." As far as recruiting agents from inside the Iraqi military, "Chalabi didn't deliver a single lieutenant, let alone a colonel or a general." Baer emphasized that he wasn't dismissive of Chalabi himself, because, as he put it, "Chalabi was trying." Even so, Baer said, "he was bluffing—he thought it was better to bluff and try to win. But he was forced to play bridge with no trump cards." Baer went on, "He always thought it was a psychological war, and that if Clinton would stand up and say, 'It's time for the guy to go,' people would do it."
The New Yorker, published 12-17-2001

August 22, 1995 - Gen. Hussein Kamel, the former director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation, in charge of Iraq's weapons programme, defected to Jordan on the night of 7 August 1995, together with his brother Col. Saddam Kamel. Hussein Kamel took crates of documents revealing past weapons programmes, and provided these to UNSCOM. Iraq responded by revealing a major store of documents that showed that Iraq had begun an unsuccessful crash programme to develop a nuclear bomb (on 20 August 1995).

Hussein and Saddam Kamel agreed to return to Iraq, where they were assassinated (23 February 1996). The interview was conducted in Amman on 22 August 1995, 15 days after Kamel left Iraq.

"I ordered destruction of all chemical weapons. All weapons - biological, chemical, missile, nuclear were destroyed" (p. 13).

Kamel specifically discussed the significance of anthrax, which he portrayed as the "main focus" of the biological programme (pp.7-8).

Smidovich asked Kamel: "were weapons and agents destroyed?" Kamel replied: "nothing remained".

[For additional background information, please visit here]
UNSCOM/IAEA interview with General Hussein Kamel (PDF), published 02-26-2003

Working for the newly elected Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, Perle and Feith as members of "The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies" author a report entitled : "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm". In the report they put forward the idea that Israel should foster a Jordanian take-over of Iraq to help secure Israel's political future.

They claim that replacing Saddam Hussein's rule with a "Hashemite" (Jordianian) Royal Family would counter Syrian ambitions in the region and help secure Israel's borders, particularly with Lebanon.

Netanyahu ultimately rejects the idea, but Perle and Feith continue to push for Saddam's overthrow in the coming years.
Richard Perle, "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm", published 06-1996

From the PNAC Homepage: "Established in the spring of 1997, the Project for the New American Century is a non-profit, educational organization whose goal is to promote American global leadership.

From the Statement of Principles page: "American foreign and defense policy is adrift. Conservatives have criticized the incoherent policies of the Clinton Administration. They have also resisted isolationist impulses from within their own ranks. But conservatives have not confidently advanced a strategic vision of America's role in the world. They have not set forth guiding principles for American foreign policy. They have allowed differences over tactics to obscure potential agreement on strategic objectives. And they have not fought for a defense budget that would maintain American security and advance American interests in the new century.

We aim to change this. We aim to make the case and rally support for American global leadership."

. . ."Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next."

[Signed by: Elliott Abrams, Gary Bauer, William J. Bennett, Jeb Bush, Dick Cheney, Eliot A. Cohen, Midge Decter, Paula Dobriansky, Steve Forbes, Aaron Friedberg, Francis Fukuyama, Frank Gaffney, Fred C. Ikle, Donald Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, I. Lewis Libby, Norman Podhoretz, Dan Quayle, Peter W. Rodman, Stephen P. Rosen, Henry S. Rowen, Donald Rumsfeld, Vin Weber, George Weigel, and Paul Wolfowitz]
PNAC Statement of Principles, published 06-03-1997

Saddam Hussein is once again thumbing his nose at the West. He's threatening to shoot down American U-2 spy planes and to stop United Nations inspectors from scouring his country in the search for weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. response? Along with a bit of saber-rattling, Washington is asking the U.N. for yet more sanctions. Haven't we been down this path before? If U.S. policy makers had been paying attention, they would have realized that sanctions will never dislodge Saddam. Instead we need to go back to the policy we tried, but never stuck with: fomenting an Iraqi insurgency to depose the butcher of Baghdad....

Washington has no choice now but to abandon the coup option and resurrect the INC. An insurgency may be able to defeat Saddam's weak and demoralized conventional army. But one thing is clear: There is no cost-free way to depose Saddam. He is more resolute, wily and brutal than we. His strength lies in his weapons of terror; that is why he is so attached to them. The week-long interruption in U.N. inspections gave him ample time to prepare his biological capability for use. Organizing an insurgency to liberate Iraq under the INC may provoke Saddam to use these weapons on the way down. Better that, though, than current policy, which will lead him to use them on his way back up.
Wall Street Journal, published 11-12-1997

Five years ago, the Dec. 1 issue of the Weekly Standard, a conservative magazine, headlined its cover with a bold directive: "Saddam Must Go: A How-to Guide." Two of the articles were written by current administration officials, including the lead one, by Zalmay M. Khalilzad, now special White House envoy to the Iraqi opposition, and Paul D. Wolfowitz, now deputy defense secretary.

"We will have to confront him sooner or later -- and sooner would be better," Khalilzad and Wolfowitz wrote. They called for "sustained attacks on the elite military units and security forces that are the main pillar of Saddam's terror-based regime."
Washington Post, published 01-12-2003

"We are writing you because we are convinced that current American policy toward Iraq is not succeeding, and that we may soon face a threat in the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War."

..."That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power. We stand ready to offer our full support in this difficult but necessary endeavor."

..."We believe the U.S. has the authority under existing UN resolutions to take the necessary steps, including military steps, to protect our vital interests in the Gulf. In any case, American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council.

We urge you to act decisively. If you act now to end the threat of weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. or its allies, you will be acting in the most fundamental national security interests of the country. If we accept a course of weakness and drift, we put our interests and our future at risk."

[Signed by: Elliott Abrams, Richard L. Armitage, William J. Bennett, Jeffrey Bergner, John Bolton, Paula Dobriansky, Francis Fukuyama, Robert Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, William Kristol, Richard Perle, Peter W. Rodman, Donald Rumsfeld, William Schneider, Jr., Vin Weber, Paul Wolfowitz, R. James Woolsey, and Robert B. Zoellick]
PNAC Letter to President Clinton on Iraq, published 01-26-1998

This was a situation replete with paradox. The former chief of United States intelligence, proud of his record as a cold warrior, was taking on the CIA. His client, sitting beside him in the scarlet jumpsuit of a high-security prisoner, had been part of an Iraqi resistance group nurtured and financed by the CIA. Now he was under threat of deportation to Saddam's Iraq, where an execution warrant had already been made out in his name, simply because "intelligence" had decreed him a threat to the national security of the United States.

Dr. Ali Karim came into Jim Woolsey's life on a March day in 1998, when the Iraqi resistance leader, Ahmad Chalabi, brought two Los Angeles public interest lawyers to his office at the Washington corporate law firm of Shea & Gardner. They told Woolsey a strange and disturbing story. Six Iraqis, members of a resistance movement supported by the CIA, were sitting in a United States jail. They had been evacuated by the U.S. along with hundreds of others after Saddam Hussein's tanks had driven them out of their base in northern Iraq in September 1996.

However, on their arrival in California, the immigration service had declared them a "danger to the national security of the United States" and sentenced them to be deported to Iraq. But the INS was refusing to say why they were a danger. All charges and evidence in the case were secret, withheld from the defense on the grounds that the lawyers were not "cleared." The lawyers had come to Woolsey because, as a lifelong member of the national security establishment and former director of central intelligence, he had stratospheric security clearances and would therefore, they thought, be able to review the evidence.
New York Times Magazine, published 07-23-2000

To accomplish Saddam's removal, the following political and military measures should be undertaken:

-- We should take whatever steps are necessary to challenge Saddam Hussein's claim to be Iraq's legitimate ruler, including indicting him as a war criminal;

-- We should help establish and support (with economic, political, and military means) a provisional, representative, and free government of Iraq in areas of Iraq not under Saddam's control;

-- We should use U.S. and allied military power to provide protection for liberated areas in northern and southern Iraq;

-- We should establish and maintain a strong U.S. military presence in the region, and be prepared to use that force to protect our vital interests in the Gulf - and, if necessary, to help remove Saddam from power.

[Signed by: Elliot Abrams, William J. Bennett, Jeffrey Bergner, John R. Bolton, Paula Dobriansky, Francis Fukuyama, Robert Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, William Kristol, Richard Perle, Peter Rodman, Donald Rumsfeld, William Schneider, Jr., Vin Weber, Paul Wolfowitz, R. James Woolsey, and Robert B. Zoellick]
PNAC Letter to Newt Gingrich and Trent Lott, published 05-29-1998

As presented to congressional leaders in a secret session in the summer of 1998, the Downing plan included several elements that have proved remarkably successful in Afghanistan. A former U.S. Special Forces commander, Downing believed that victory would be achieved through a potent combination of U.S.-backed insurgents, massive enemy defections, elite special operations units and U.S. air power.

. . .In its original version, Downing's plan envisaged an initial commitment of no more than 5,000 or 6,000 "crack troops" to defeat a demoralized Iraqi army of a half-million men, assuming that U.S. warplanes were available to destroy enemy troop concentrations.
Washington Post, published 12-27-2001

Sec. 4 ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT A TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ.
(2) MILITARY ASSISTANCE
(A) The President is authorized to direct the drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense, defense services of the Department of Defense, and military education and training for such organizations.

(B) The aggregate value (as defined in section 644(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) of assistance provided under this paragraph may not exceed $97,000,000.

Sec. 8 RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the use of United States Armed Forces (except as provided in section 4(a)(2)) in carrying out this Act.
Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, published 10-31-1998

To help him locate Kosovo, Bush assembled a group of eight Republican experts, nicknamed the Vulcans, to tutor him on world affairs. The group was led by Condoleezza Rice, the provost at Stanford University and previously his father’s White House adviser on the Soviet Union, and Paul Wolfowitz, the dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Undersecretary for Defense Policy in the first Bush administration.

The other Vulcans were Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Reagan administration; Robert Blackwill, White House adviser on European and Soviet affairs in the first Bush administration; Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy in the first Bush administration; Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy during the Reagan administration; Dov Zakheim, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Planning and Resources in the Reagan administration; and Robert Zoellick, Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs and White House Deputy Chief of Staff during the first Bush administration.

Bush’s choice of these eight advisers was significant because it signaled his own foreign policy pre-dispositions.
Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, "The Bush Revolution: The Remaking of America's Foreign Policy" (PDF), published 04-25-2003

JB [BORGER]: Do you think they came into office with that as a plan?

RC [CLARKE]: If you look at the so-called Vulcans group [Bush's pre-election foreign policy advisors] talked about publicly in seminars in Washington. They clearly wanted to go after Iraq and they clearly wanted to do this reshaping of the middle east and they used the tragedy of 9/11 as an excuse to test their theories.

JB [BORGER]: Do you think President Bush was already on board when he came to office.

RC [CLARKE]: I think he was. He got his international education from the Vulcans group the previous year. They were people like Richard Perle, Jim Woolsey, Paul Wolfowitz. They were all espousing this stuff. So he probably had been persuaded. He certainly wasn't hearing any contrary view during this education process.
The Guardian, published 03-23-2004

"I'll tell you, he was thinking about invading Iraq in 1999," Herskowitz told Baker. "One of the things he said to me, is 'One of the keys to being seen as a great leader is to be seen as a commander-in-chief.' And he said, 'My father had all this political capital built up when he drove the Iraqis out of [Kuwait] and he wasted it.'"

[Original article behind subscription wall, archive image of webpage available here]
Houston Chronicle, published 11-01-2004

Two years before the September 11 attacks, presidential candidate George W. Bush was already talking privately about the political benefits of attacking Iraq, according to his former ghost writer, who held many conversations with then-Texas Governor Bush in preparation for a planned autobiography.

. . .Herskowitz said that Bush expressed frustration at a lifetime as an underachiever in the shadow of an accomplished father. In aggressive military action, he saw the opportunity to emerge from his father’s shadow. The moment, Herskowitz said, came in the wake of the September 11 attacks. “Suddenly, he’s at 91 percent in the polls, and he’d barely crawled out of the bunker.”
Russ Baker, "Bush Wanted To Invade Iraq If Elected in 2000", published 10-27-2004

BUSH: I wouldn't ease the sanctions, and I wouldn't try to negotiate with him.

I'd make darn sure that he lived up to the agreements that he signed back in the early '90s. I'd be helping the opposition groups. And if I found in any way, shape or form that he was developing weapons of mass destruction, I'd take 'em out. I'm surprised he's still there. I think a lot of other people are as well.

MR. HUME: Take him out?

BUSH: To out the weapons of mass destruction.
Republican Presidential Debate, published 12-02-1999

In 2000, Woolsey served briefly as a corporate officer for the INC unit that handled U.S. funding, the Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation. He and his former law firm, Shea and Gardner, did pro bono work for the INC and Iraqi exiles.
Knight Ridder, published 07-15-2004

Bush also defended his father's decision to end the 1991 Persian Gulf War without sending troops after Saddam Hussein, and said as president he would ensure Iraq didn't develop weapons of mass destruction.

"If we catch them developing weapons of mass destruction, there won't be any weapons of mass destruction left in Iraq if I'm the commander in chief," Bush told reporters, without giving details. "I'm not going to tell you what I mean, because I'm not going to tell Saddam Hussein what I mean."
CNN - Politics, published 02-11-2000

Osama Siblani, publisher of "The Arab American" newspaper, says George W Bush told him in May 2000 - before he was nominated as the Republican presidential candidate - that he is going to "take out" Iraq and Saddam Hussein.
Democracy Now, published 03-11-2005

Though the immediate mission of those forces is to enforce the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq, they represent the long-term commitment of the United States and its major allies to a region of vital importance. Indeed, the United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein.
PNAC, "Rebuilding America's Defenses" (PDF), published 09-2000

Candidates Bush/Cheney talking points:

The international coalition assembled during the Gulf War has come apart.

UN inspectors have not set foot in Iraq for almost two years, failing to monitor any attempts to produce weapons of mass destruction.

. . .As U.S. influence in the Gulf has waned, Iraq’s relative influence as an oil supplier to U.S. and world markets has increased:

. . .Perhaps most ominously, Saddam Hussein is threatening to cut back production and is again claiming that Kuwait is stealing Iraq’s oil – the same claim Iraq made in 1990.

[Original web page is no longer available]
George W. Bush, "A Comprehensive National Energy Policy", published 09-29-2000

MODERATOR: New question. How would you go about as president deciding when it was in the national interest to use U.S. force, generally?

BUSH: Well, if it's in our vital national interest, and that means whether our territory is threatened or people could be harmed, whether or not the alliances are -- our defense alliances are threatened, whether or not our friends in the Middle East are threatened. That would be a time to seriously consider the use of force. Secondly, whether or not the mission was clear. Whether or not it was a clear understanding as to what the mission would be. Thirdly, whether or not we were prepared and trained to win. Whether or not our forces were of high morale and high standing and well-equipped. And finally, whether or not there was an exit strategy. I would take the use of force very seriously. I would be guarded in my approach. I don't think we can be all things to all people in the world. I think we've got to be very careful when we commit our troops.
First Presidential Debate, published 10-03-2000

Bush: "Secondly, that I think it's important to reach out to moderate Arab nations, like Jordan and Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It's important to be friends with people when you don't need each other so that when you do there's a strong bond of friendship. And that's going to be particularly important in dealing not only with situations such as now occurring in Israel, but with Saddam Hussein. The coalition against Saddam has fallen apart or it's unraveling, let's put it that way. The sanctions are being violated. We don't know whether he's developing weapons of mass destruction. He better not be or there's going to be a consequence should I be the president." ...

BUSH: That's hard to tell. I think that, you know, I would hope to be able to convince people I could handle the Iraqi situation better.

MODERATOR: Saddam Hussein, you mean, get him out of there?

BUSH: I would like to, of course, and I presume this administration would as well. We don't know -- there are no inspectors now in Iraq, the coalition that was in place isn't as strong as it used to be. He is a danger. We don't want him fishing in troubled waters in the Middle East. And it's going to be hard, it's going to be important to rebuild that coalition to keep the pressure on him.
Second Presidential Debate, published 10-11-2000

There are probably about 25,000 military personnel in the CENTCOM area, including a Brigade sized Army unit in Kuwait [about 5,000 soldiers], approximately 5,000 Air Force personnel, between 13,000-15,000 sailors and Marines [the Navy provides the lower number which does not include civilians, while a direct count suggests the higher number], and joint headquarters and other joint units comprised of 1,000 people.

The number of troops deployed in the area fluctuates on a daily basis, and has averaged between 20,000 and 25,000 in recent years. Naval force personnel levels have varied between 8,000 and 15,000, while Army training exercises routinely deploy upwards of 1,500 troops for periods of a few weeks. The EUCOM Area of Responsibility includes approximately 1,000 Air Force personnel at Incrilik AB Turkey, flying Operation North Watch patrols.
GlobalSecurity.org, published 08-2005

You can't worry about polls or focus groups. You've got to have a clear vision. That's what a leader does. A leader also understands that the United States must be strong to keep the peace. Saddam Hussein still is a threat in the Middle East. Our coalition against Saddam is unraveling. Sanctions are loosened. The man who may be developing weapons of mass destruction, we don't know because inspectors aren't in. So to answer your question, it requires a clear vision, a willingness to stand by our friends, and the credibility for people both friend and foe to understand when America says something, we mean it.
Third and final Presidential Debate, published 10-17-2000

I readily admit I'm not going to grow the size of the federal government like he is. Your question was deployment. It must be in the national interests, must be in our vital interests whether we ever send troops. The mission must be clear. Soldiers must understand why we're going. The force must be strong enough so that the mission can be accomplished. And the exit strategy needs to be well-defined. I'm concerned that we're overdeployed around the world. See, I think the mission has somewhat become fuzzy. Should I be fortunate enough to earn your confidence, the mission of the United States military will be to be prepared and ready to fight and win war. And therefore prevent war from happening in the first place. There may be some moments when we use our troops as peacekeepers, but not often.

The Vice President mentioned my view of long-term for the military. I want to make sure the equipment for our military is the best it can possibly be, of course. ... First thing I'm going to do is ask the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan so we are making sure we're not spending our money on political projects, but on projects to make sure our soldiers are well-paid, well-housed, and have the best equipment in the world.
Third and final Presidential Debate, published 10-17-2000

Crises can be opportunities. Israel must avoid letting Arafat prolong the intermittent war of attrition in West Bank towns. Arafat wants that war; Israel cannot win it. Instead, Israel and the United States should adopt a coordinated strategy to regain the initiative and reverse their regionwide strategic retreat. They should broaden the conflict to strike fatally, not merely disarm, the centers of radicalism in the region—the regimes of Damascus, Baghdad, Tripoli, Tehran, and Gaza. That would reestablish the recognition that fighting with either the United States or Israel is suicidal.

Many in the Middle East will then understand the merits of being an American ally and of making peace with Israel. They will even discuss again how powerful freedom is, as they did early in the 1990s.
Washington Times Op-Ed, published 11-01-2000

Did it start with a break-in? On the morning of Jan. 2, 2001, Italian police discovered that the Niger Embassy in Rome had been ransacked. Not much was reported missing – only a watch and two bottles of perfume – but someone had apparently rifled through embassy papers, leaving them strewn about the floor.

Some months after the break-in, the Italian intelligence service – the SISME – obtained a stack of official-looking documents from an African diplomat. Signed by officials of the government of Niger, the papers revealed what purported to be a deal with the Devil. Agents of Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein, it appeared, were angling to purchase from the cash-starved, mineral-rich African nation some 500 tons of yellowcake, the pure uranium that can be used to build nuclear bombs. Excited by their intelligence coup, the Italians quickly notified the CIA and British intelligence.

[Article also archived here.]
Newsweek, published 07-28-2003

About half of the 75-minute meeting in the secure conference room where the military chiefs conduct their most sensitive business, focused on a discussion about Iraq and the Persian Gulf, two participants said. Iraq was the first topic briefed because "it's the most visible and most risky area" Mr. Bush will confront after he takes office, one senior officer said.

Mr. Bush did not say how he would deal with Iraq, the participants said, but asked several questions about President Saddam Hussein and American allies in the region, before the generals briefing him addressed other possible flashpoints, including the Balkans and the Korean peninsula.

"Iraqi policy is very much on his mind," one senior Pentagon official said. "Saddam was clearly a discussion point."
New York Times, published 01-10-2001

Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the exiled opposition group the Iraqi National Congress, has been in touch with incoming members of the Bush administration.

"I think President-elect Bush has said that he will deal very harshly with any developments that Saddam will undertake in making weapons, and Saddam is doing it so I expect some vigorous action."

Mr. Chalabi's group has just been given tentative approval by the outgoing Clinton administration to begin humanitarian operations in areas of Iraq under allied protection.

"We want to start this at the end of February. We are hopeful and we expect a positive response to our programs and our plans from the new administration."
Voice of America, published 01-17-2001

Boucher: "Much has changed in 10 years but there are two constants - Saddam Hussein's continued duplicity and brutality and the resolve of the international community to help the Iraqi people and to prevent Saddam Hussein from seriously threatening the region again."
Reuters, published 01-17-2001

Britain promised yesterday to show flexibility towards Baghdad if it opened talks to resume UN weapons inspections in Iraq, a key condition for the suspension of sanctions. Speaking on the eve of the 10th anniversary of the 1991 Gulf War, junior Foreign Office minister Peter Hain said Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would find "reasonable people ready to do business" if he signalled a readiness to negotiate. ...

"I want to see sanctions suspended. Britain wants to see sanctions suspended, and the route for that remains (UN resolution) 1284," he said. The resolution promises a suspension of sanctions six months after the resumption of arms inspections, broken off in 1998 when U.S. and British forces bombed Iraq in retaliation for Baghdad's alleged non-cooperation. ...

But British diplomats have privately signalled unease at the continued impasse over sanctions and said Britain would try to persuade the United States to end patrols over the no-fly zone in southern Iraq, which they said were risky and costly and a source of resentment in neighbouring Saudi Arabia. ...

He said London had begun talks on Iraq with the incoming administration of President-elect George W. Bush, whose officials have talked of more robust U.S. action against Baghdad - a step which would widen international divisions on Iraq. But Hain played down the chances of a sharp change in U.S. policy.

[Note to reader: Original web page no longer available]
Reuters, published 01-17-2001

In a 45-minute interview with Reuters two days before his inauguration as the 43rd president of the United States, Bush also called Saddam "a wild card" who could destabilize the world's oil supplies.

Asked if he would use military force against the Iraqi leader, Bush replied: "If he crosses the line, the answer's yes. If we catch him developing weapons of mass destruction, the answer's yes."
Reuters, published 01-19-2001

The administration intends to maintain and re-energize sanctions against Iraq because Iraq remains a threat to regional peace, Boucher said. Boucher also said that there "is a strong voice and view within the international community that Iraq needs to be prevented" from developing weapons of mass destruction. ....

Q: If Iraq has reconstituted some of its BW or CW capabilities, doesn't that make it a threat?

MR. BOUCHER: The question that faces the international community is how to keep Iraq to its obligations and prevent it from reconstituting the threat. While the attempts to rebuild that have been discussed in this report clearly show Iraq's intentions, I don't think we would go beyond that and say that Iraq has a new capability at this point.
State Dept - Washington File, published 01-22-2001

Imam Sayed Hassan al-Qazwini, the leader of the Islamic Center of America in Detroit, one of the nation's largest mosques, said that he had spoken to Mr. Bush six or seven times, before and after the 2000 election, about removing Saddam Hussein.

Imam Qazwini said that on Jan. 29, 2001, the day before the first National Security Council meeting of the administration, he met with Mr. Bush at the White House. The president, he said, was supportive of efforts to oust Mr. Hussein, although he did not specifically mention war as a means of doing so. "It was a general desire for regime change."
New York Times, published 01-13-2004

"THE PRESIDENT: This is the first in a series of meetings which will be chaired by Vice President Cheney on discussing our nation's energy situation. Can't think of a better man to run it than the Vice President.

I've also asked, and he has asked that senior members of the Cabinet participate. This is a matter of high concern for this administration, because it's a matter of high concern for our nation. It's becoming very clear to the country that demand is outstripping supply...."

Cheney will meet with top officials of energy suppliers and producers to shape energy policy for the new administration.
Remarks by the President at Energy Policy Meeting, published 01-29-2001

“From the very beginning, there was a conviction, that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that he needed to go,” says [Paul] O’Neill, who adds that going after Saddam was topic "A" 10 days after the inauguration - eight months before Sept. 11.

“From the very first instance, it was about Iraq. It was about what we can do to change this regime,” says [Ron] Suskind. “Day one, these things were laid and sealed.”...

"It was all about finding a way to do it. That was the tone of it. The president saying ‘Go find me a way to do this,’" says [Paul] O’Neill. “For me, the notion of pre-emption, that the U.S. has the unilateral right to do whatever we decide to do, is a really huge leap.”
CBS - 60 Minutes, published 01-11-2004

George Bush’s former treasury secretary Paul O’Neill has revealed that the President took office in January 2001 fully intending to invade Iraq and desperate to find an excuse for pre-emptive war against Saddam Hussein.

O’Neill’s claims tally with long-running investigations by the Sunday Herald which have shown how the Bush cabinet planned a pre- meditated attack on Iraq in order to “regime change” Saddam long before the neoconservative Republicans took power.

The Sunday Herald previously uncovered how a think-tank–-run by vice-president Dick Cheney; defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld; Paul Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld’s deputy; Bush’s younger brother Jeb, the governor of Florida; and Lewis Libby, Cheney’s deputy–-wrote a blueprint for regime change as early as September 2000.
Sunday Herald, published 01-11-2004

President George Bush has taken the first step towards making the overthrow of Saddam Hussein an explicit goal of US policy on Iraq, a move which could cause a significant split within his new team.

The Bush administration has issued an order permitting Iraqi opposition groups to begin limited moves inside Iraq using US government funding. The decision followed a meeting on Iraq policy at the White House on Tuesday, chaired by Mr Bush.

The moves are limited to a programme described as the "collection of informational materials", but they signal further steps in the same direction and cross a line in the sand which the Clinton administration was exceptionally reluctant to pass. ...

The new order is a clear sign that the Bush administration intends to push US policy towards Iraq in a different direction from the containment policy followed by President Clinton and US allies including Britain.
The Guardian, published 02-03-2001

The hour almost up, Bush had assignments for everyone. Powell and his team would look to draw up a new sanctions regime. Rumsfeld and Shelton, he said, "should examine our military options." That included rebuilding the military coalition from the 1991 Gulf War, examining "how it might look" to use U.S. ground forces in the north and south of Iraq and how the armed forces could support groups inside the country who could help challenge Saddam Hussein. Tenet would report on improving our current intelligence. O'Neill would investigate how to financially squeeze the regime.

Meeting adjourned. Ten days in, and it was about Iraq.

O'Neill walked back to Treasury, running scenes from the situation room through his head. "Getting Hussein was now the administration's focus, that much was already clear," he recalled.
Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty, p. 74, published 01-13-2004

SUMMARY: "Cooperative Belt” early warning network started. The network provided radar, early warning and secure communications links between the six GCC ( Gulf Cooperative Council) nations. (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates)
Defense Department, "Allied Contributions to the Common Defense", published 03-17-2001

The industry-favoured plan was pushed aside by a secret plan, drafted just before the invasion in 2003, which called for the sell-off of all of Iraq's oil fields. The new plan was crafted by neo-conservatives intent on using Iraq's oil to destroy the Opec cartel through massive increases in production above Opec quotas.

The sell-off was given the green light in a secret meeting in London headed by Fadhil Chalabi shortly after the US entered Baghdad, according to Robert Ebel.

Mr Ebel, a former Energy and CIA oil analyst, now a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, told Newsnight he flew to the London meeting at the request of the State Department.

Mr Aljibury, once Ronald Reagan's "back-channel" to Saddam, claims that plans to sell off Iraq's oil, pushed by the US-installed Governing Council in 2003, helped instigate the insurgency and attacks on US and British occupying forces
BBC News, published 03-17-2005

Wolfowitz's office did not respond to inquiries Wednesday about Woolsey's travels. Woolsey, in two telephone conversations this week, declined to discuss his trips to England last month and in February. "I have nothing to say about my trips to the UK," he said Wednesday.
Knight Ridder, published 10-11-2001

O'Neill arrived a few minutes early and read the cover sheet of his briefing materials.

Purpose: To review the current state-of-play (including CIA briefing on Iraq) and to examine policy questions on how to proceed.

Attachments:

Tab A: Agenda and Policy Questions (from NSC) - SECRET

Tab B: Economic Background on Iraq (from Deutsche Bank)

Tab C: Executive Summary: Political-Military Plan for Post-Saddam Iraq Crisis (interagency working paper) - SECRET

Tab D: Summary of United States Sanctions on Iraq

Tab E: "Iraq Sanctions Regime," State Department, for use in public statements
Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty, p. 82, published 01-13-2004

Q: Do you see Iraq emerging as a problem in the short term again?

SECRETARY POWELL: Problem? Iraq is a problem for its own people. I think we have to keep reminding everybody that this is an arms control problem. They are threatening their neighbors. They threaten the children of the region with weapons of mass destruction. They can't project conventional power very effectively, so they're trying to gain strength by threatening the people of the region. They made a commitment to do away with these weapons, and I think the international community and the United Nations has to hold them to that commitment. And I'll be working with our friends in the region; the President will be working with our friends in the region and our friends in the United Nations to hold them to account for the obligations they made.

Q: Meaning allowing the inspectors back in?

SECRETARY POWELL: Hold them to account for the obligations they made. The obligations were not solely around inspectors. The obligations were to show to the international community that they no longer are developing these kinds of weapons and that they do not have them.
State Dept Press Briefing, published 02-01-2001

State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said the U.S. government is disbursing $4 million to the opposition Iraqi National Congress (INC) to fund its public information programs and other activities. ...

"The Iraqi opposition gather information inside Iraq to help build the case against the Iraqi leadership for crimes against humanity," Boucher said. "That is what we discussed in our October 2nd statement. This license is the technical license that allows them to do that using this U.S. government money.
State Dept - Washington File, published 02-02-2001

Q: Ari, a question on Iraq. Does the $4 million authorized for use by the Iraqi opposition represent a stepped-up U.S. effort against Saddam Hussein?

MR. FLEISCHER: The $4 million grant to the INC that was mentioned in the article you reference was initiated and appropriated in 1999. This was FY 2000 money intended to help the INC to gather information inside Iraq to help build a case against Iraqi leadership for crimes against humanity. A license application was submitted to OFAC under the previous administration to spend the money inside Iraq. And since passage of the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998, the United States has worked to try to improve the capabilities of the Iraqi opposition. This is a further step in that process, and it is consistent with President Bush's support for the Iraqi opposition. So this ties back to the previous legislation.

Q: It's not a stepped-up effort, then?

MR. FLEISCHER: No, this is in accordance with previously passed legislation.
White House Press Briefing - Ari Fleisher, published 02-02-2002

MR. DONALDSON: First, do you think he has been developing weapons of mass destruction? Do you have any evidence?

SECRETARY POWELL: Well, we have to assume that he has never lost his goal or gone away from his goal of developing such weapons. And that is unfortunate because, as long as he pursues that goal, the United Nations has to remain engaged. He made a commitment at the end of the Gulf War that he would not develop these weapons and he would demonstrate to the international community that he was not doing so. He has failed to meet those obligations.

And as a result, the people of the region are threatened; the children of the region are threatened by Saddam Hussein and his potential possession of these kinds of weapons.

MR. DONALDSON: What you seem to be suggesting to me that, at the moment, you don't have enough evidence to believe that you should follow through on President Bush's words to take out those weapons.

SECRETARY POWELL: We reserve the right to use whatever means may be necessary if we had a specific set of targets, or something occurred to us, or we found something that we think would be appropriate to go after.
ABC - This Week, published 02-04-2002

Q: You said in your testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that you were looking at reenergizing sanctions against Iraq. Members of the opposition are in town right now. They just received a license to operate within Iraq with U.S. funds, looking for more logistical support.

When you take your trip to the region to meet with US allies there, will you be reviewing a much harder policy towards Saddam Hussein? And are you realistic that there could be a democratic regime change during your tenure?

SECRETARY POWELL: Well, I'm always optimistic. I think democracy is such a powerful set of principles and a powerful system that one can always hope that people who are not living under democratic systems will eventually come to the realization that they could do a lot better in the 21st century..but we will prevent him (Saddam)...from doing is to go forward with weapons of mass destruction.
State Dept Press Briefing, published 02-09-2001

Mr. SNOW: Is Iraq a nuclear threat?

Mr. RUMSFELD: Iraq is probably not a nuclear threat at the present time. There's no question but that its nuclear capabilities were well advanced, and much farther advanced than Western intelligence capabilities knew. And we were very fortunate that the Israelis went in some time before, and took out their nuclear capability.
Fox News Sunday, published 02-11-2001

MR. DONALDSON: Let's look about Iraq, now. And let's look at a Defense Department report that was released just this month. Part of which reads as follows, that "Baghdad, likely, in the absence of UNSCOM inspections and monitoring during 1999 and 2000, we're concerned that Baghdad, again, may have produced some biological warfare agents." The report also said that Baghdad likely also has warheads capable of delivering chemical or biological agents. Do they?

Rumsfeld: There's no question but that Saddam Hussein and his regime have had an enormous appetite for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons over a sustained period of time. There's nothing new about this. They have been, in varying degrees, successful in developing those types of capabilities.
ABC - This Week, published 02-11-2001

MS. BORGER: This is, as you know, the tenth anniversary of the Gulf War. Do you believe Saddam Hussein is stronger or weaker than he was?

SECRETARY POWELL: He's weaker, he's much weaker. That million-man army of ten years ago is gone. He is sitting on a very much smaller army of perhaps 350,000 that does not have the capacity to invade its neighbors any longer. He is living in three concentric rings of jails that he has created for himself in order to protect himself behind a security cordon. He has a great deal of money available to him through our Oil-for-Food Program, which he refuses to use entirely for the benefit of his people and for his children. Instead, he continues to pursue weapons of mass destruction to threaten the people and children of the region.
CBS - Face the Nation, published 02-12-2001

Q: Iraqi opposition groups are in the State Department today. Whom did they meet with and do you have any more information?

MR. BOUCHER: Yes, there were some meetings today with the Iraqi National Congress, or there will be. Assistant Secretary Walker is scheduled to meet with them this afternoon. The meeting is part of our ongoing cooperation with the Iraqi National Congress and other elements of the Iraqi opposition. Today's meeting will focus on operational details involved in implementing the cooperative agreement between the Iraqi National Congress and the Department of State.

Above except near the end portion of the briefing.
State Dept Press Briefing, published 02-13-2001

There is a new book out that American Enterprise Institute, where Richard is, has published--and Jeff--by Laurie Milroy (ph) called "The Study of Revenge," about Saddam, which makes, I think, a reasonable case, certainly one that deserves anyone who disagrees to try to refute it, that Iraq may have had a substantial hand in the World Trade Center bombing.
Panel Discussion at American Enterprise Institute, published 02-15-2001

U.S. and British aircraft attacked targets near Baghdad outside the Western-imposed no-fly zone for the first time since Operation Desert Fox in 1998.

U.S. Defense officials said 24 American and British planes struck five Iraqi military targets five to 20 miles from Baghdad using various long-range precision-guided weapons. The President Bush, said he had authorized the strikes, and was keeping a close eye on Iraq.

[Original web page no longer available]
Reuters, published 02-16-2001

WASHINGTON, Feb. 21, 2001 - The American public should not consider the bombings in Iraq Feb. 16 as the end of U.S. involvement in the area.

"Because this is an ongoing operation, we expect to keep it going until the national leadership changes the policy of this country," Navy Rear Admiral Craig Quigley said in a Feb. 20 Pentagon briefing.
Dept of Defense - American Forces Press Service, published 02-21-2001

THE PRESIDENT: We're reviewing all policy in all regions of the world, and one of the areas we've been spending a lot of time on is the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. The Secretary of State is going to go listen to our allies as to how best to effect a policy, the primary goal of which will be to say to Saddam Hussein, we won't tolerate you developing weapons of mass destruction and we expect you to leave your neighbors alone.

I have said that the sanction regime is like Swiss cheese. That meant that they weren't very effective. And we're going to review current sanction policy, and review options as to how to make the sanctions work. But the primary goal is to make it clear to Saddam that we expect him to be a peaceful neighbor in the region and we expect him not to develop weapons of mass destruction. And if we find him doing so, there will be a consequence.
Press Conference by the President, published 02-22-2001

THE PRESIDENT: We took action last week, and it may be on your mind as to that decision I made. The mission was twofold - one was to send him a clear message that this administration will remain engaged in that part of the world. I think we accomplished that mission. We got his attention.

And secondly, the mission was to degrade his capacity to harm our pilots who might be flying in the no-fly zone. And we accomplished that mission, as well.
Press Conference by the President, published 02-22-2001

Q: Back to Iraq for a moment. You said the Prime Minister and the President will be examining means to reach their goals in regards to Saddam Hussein and Iraq. Is it possible that the sanctions, as they are now, are no longer the appropriate means to reach the goals?

DR. RICE: I think we're reviewing everything at this point. But it is very clear that whatever we do, we have to make sure that Saddam Hussein is constrained, that he does not acquire weapons of mass destruction, that he cannot threaten his neighbors.

[Unable to locate this transcript on any US Government website.]
White House Press Briefing - Condoleezza Rice, published 02-22-2001

"I think we ought to declare [the containment policy] a success. We have kept him contained, kept him in his box."

He added Saddam "is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors" and that "he threatens not the United States."
State Dept Press Briefing, published 02-23-2001

THE PRESIDENT: We spent a lot of time talking about our mutual interests in Iraq and the Persian Gulf, and from our perspective, as you know, I made the famous statement that our sanctions are like Swiss cheese. That means they're not very effective. And we're going to work together to figure out a way to make them more effective.

But I think the Prime Minister and I both recognize that it is going to be important for us to build a consensus in the region to make the sanctions more effective. Colin Powell left today, after lunch, to move around the Middle East, collect thoughts and to listen, with a policy of strengthening our mission to make it clear to Saddam Hussein that he shall not terrorize his neighbors, and not develop weapons of mass destruction.

PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: Yes, I'd like to just add to that. I think that -- I mean, of course, we look the whole time to see how we can make sanctions more effective. But don't be under any doubt at all of our absolute determination to make sure that the threat of Saddam Hussein is contained and that he is not able to develop these weapons of mass destruction that he wishes to do.
Joint Press Conference at Camp David, published 02-23-2001

…[Saddam] has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors.
Press Remarks with Foreign Minister of Egypt, published 02-24-2001

The BND says it has evidence to suggest the following:

Iraq has resumed its nuclear programme and may be capable of producing an atomic bomb in three years. Work has been observed at the Al Qaim site, believed to be the centre of Baghdad's nuclear programme.

Iraq is currently developing its Al Samoud and Ababil 100/Al Fatah short-range rockets, which can deliver a 300kg payload 150km (95 miles). Medium-range rockets capable of carrying a warhead 3,000km (1,900 miles) could be built by 2005 - far enough to reach Europe. Iraq is also believed to be capable of manufacturing solid rocket fuel.

A Delhi-based company, blacklisted by the German Government because of its alleged role in weapons proliferation, has acted as a buyer on Iraq's behalf. Deliveries have been made via Malaysia and Dubai. Since the UN inspectors left, the number of Iraqi sites involved in chemicals production has increased from 20 to 80. Of that total, the BND believes a quarter to be involved in making weapons.

Widespread procurement activity has been observed abroad and production of biological weapons could be resumed at short notice. It is possible that production may already have begun.
BBC News, published 02-25-2001

At a stop in Kuwait City earlier, Powell pledged that "freedom will live and prosper in this part of the world'' in spite of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, whose forces were driven from Kuwait 10 years ago.

"Aggression will not stand,'' Powell said as he joined former President Bush and Norman Schwarzkopf, the U.S. commander in the Gulf War against Iraq, in honoring the 148 Americans killed in combat in the 1991 conflict.

"We want the world to know our quarrel is not with the people of Iraq. It is with the regime in Baghdad,'' he said.

[Original web page requires a fee to view]
Associated Press (PDF), published 02-26-2001

"We are going to tighten the sanctions on weapons of mass destruction, tighten the sanctions on armaments, tighten the sanctions on the sorts of equipment and other materials that put the people of the region at risk. That is the direction that we are headed in," Boucher said at his regular press briefing in Washington February 28.

With regard to easing restrictions on consumer goods to Iraq, Boucher said, "If you tighten the controls on the weapons of mass destruction and further define the dual-use equipment..., then you can remove some of your restrictions, make the civilian stuff go more smoothly. And that will be the direction."
State Dept - Washington File, published 02-28-2001

March 2001: A cadre of Iraqi rebels descend on a training camp in Texas. For five days they fire pistols, shotguns and Kalashnikov rifles, and otherwise hone their combat and self-defense skills.

They are bitter foes of Saddam Hussein. Members of the Iraqi National Congress, they dream of the day when they can march triumphantly into Baghdad as a liberation army.

Their mentor -- and biggest cheerleader -- is Wayne Downing.

"This is the first time they are being trained to do anything on this level," the former general tells a United Press International reporter. But to Downing the weapons course, paid for by the United States, is a "drop in the bucket." What the dissidents really need, he says, is training on "antitank weapons, machine guns, rockets, that sort of thing."
Washington Post, published 11-20-2001

Iraqi rebels are scheduled to go to College Station, Texas, for their first round of weapons training from federal lawmen and members of the military's Special Forces under a U.S. plan to support insurgency activities inside Iraq.

The Iraqi National Congress are in the final stages of completing a $98,000 contract with the Guidry Group, a consulting firm comprised of ex-secret service agents. What distinguishes this training from previous courses for the INC, is that the rebels attending the five-day seminar will also learn how to use pistols, Kalishnikov rifles, 12-gauge shotguns and a variety of other firearms. Previous U.S.-backed training for the INC has been limited to "non-lethal" activities, such as emergency medical care, public relations and war crimes investigations.
United Press International, published 02-12-2001

Six weeks after Bush took office, on March 1, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, CIA Director George Tenet, Powell and Rice met to revisit policy toward Iraq, including new military options. The review was still being developed on Sept. 11.
USA Today, published 09-10-2002

VP Dick Cheney meets with major energy and oil interests to formulate US energy policy. Cheney's Energy Task Force authors a variety of documents relating to the oil industries of Iraq, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.

"Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield contracts" - This document, dated March 5, 2001, includes a table listing 30 countries which have interests in Iraq's oil industry. The document also includes the names of companies that have interests, the oil fields with which those interests are associated, as well as the statuses of those interests.

"Map of Iraq's oil fields" - The map includes markings for "supergiant" oil fields of 5 billion barrels or more, other oilfields, fields "earmarked for production sharing," oil pipelines, operational refineries, and tanker terminals.

[See also full text of documents at link below]
Judicial Watch, published 07-17-2003

Q: Regarding Iraq sanctions, is it - regarding the efforts to get inspectors into Iraq, has the State Department and the Bush Administration agreed to sort of put that on the back burner? Is that a back burner issue now, giving way to other things?

MR. BOUCHER: No.

Q: Inspectors - okay.

MR. BOUCHER: No, and I think - I know there was a newspaper that made much of a certain statement by Vice President Cheney over the weekend. But he said clearly what we have said before: we would like to see the inspectors back, but we are not going to hinge our entire policy on whether the inspectors go back or not. You look at what Secretary Powell said last week during his trip, and then when he got to the European Union, he made quite clear that Iraq, at the end of the day, will have to decide whether to let the inspectors back in. If they don't come back in, then the conditions set by the United Nations will not be met, and he will have to remain trapped in his box.
State Dept Press Briefing, published 03-05-2001

Secretary of State Colin Powell said the modified Iraq sanctions policy will prevent Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein from acquiring weapons of mass destruction but allow Iraqi civilians to obtain needed consumer goods.

"We will keep them from developing their military capability again, just the way we have for the last ten years, but we will not be the ones to blame because the Iraqi people, it is claimed, are not getting what they need to take care of their children or to take care of their needs," Powell said at a press conference with Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh in Washington March 6.

Powell said he has received expressions of support from Arab leaders about the modified Iraq sanctions policy.
State Dept - Washington File, published 03-06-2001

Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee March 8 that the United Nations sanctions regime has kept Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in check. "Even though we know he is working on weapons of mass destruction, we know he has things squirreled away, at the same time we have not seen that capacity emerge to present a full fledged threat to us," he said.
State Dept - Washington File, published 03-08-2001

Ahmad Chalabi visits Iran to establish a base for sending roughly 100 INC operatives into northern Iraq to gather intelligence and distribute "humanitarian aid." The Iraqi National Congress secured necessary licenses from the Office of Foreign Asset Control as early as 2001 to spend U.S. government grant funds inside Iran as a specific activity within their overall grant.

"Middle East Report" covers story on 3-27-2001. http://www.merip.org/mero/mero032301.html
State Dept. confirms 3 years later.
State Dept Press Briefing, published 05-21-2004

Shortly after Bush is inaugurated into office, Greg Thielmann, an analyst for the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), is appointed to serve as the intelligence liaison to John Bolton. But Thielmann's intelligence briefings do not support Bolton's assumptions about Iraq, and Thielmann is soon barred from attending the meetings.

According to Thielmann: “Bolton seemed to be troubled because INR was not telling him what he wanted to hear. I was intercepted at the door of his office and told, ‘The undersecretary doesn't need you to attend this meeting anymore. The undersecretary wants to keep this in the family.'"
The New Yorker - The Stovepipe, published 10-20-2003

The resulting tight markets have increased U.S. and global vulnerability to disruption and provided adversaries undue potential influence over the price of oil. Iraq has become a key “swing” producer, posing a difficult situation for the U.S. government.
Baker Institute, Strategic Energy Policy Challenges for the 21st Century, published 04-10-2001

The conference was hosted by the Iraq Foundation in Washington April 6. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Edward Walker participated in one panel discussion on Iraq's future and what might be done to encourage regime change.

Walker said that when the Bush administration took over in January, an Iraq policy review was undertaken in three areas: the United Nations and its sanctions policy; U.S. military posture and how it relates to the No-Fly zones; and "how best to achieve a policy that will give a better life to the Iraqi people." ....

Charles Duelfer, a former U.N. weapons inspector for Iraq and now a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said Iraq still retains a WMD capability and "has a track record over the past 25 years" of using it. He said that the regime likely has retained missile technology to deliver WMD agents.

Duelfer said that Iraq is not as big a threat as it was in 1989 but still presents a serious threat to its neighbors and Mideast stability.
State Dept - Washington File, published 04-10-2001

Summary: “STRATEGIC ENERGY POLICY CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY” a report of an independent task force sponsored by the “James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University” and the “Council on Foreign Relations”. The purpose of the study was to set up guidelines and recommendations for the formulation of a new US energy policy.

Members of the task force included: Ken Lay: CEO Enron, John Manzoni: Regional President BP, Steven Miller: CEO Shell Oil, David Reilly: CEO Chevron/Texaco, Chuck Watson: CEO Dynegy, Edward Morse: Exec. Advisor Hess, Eric Melby: Scowcroft Group, Thomas McLarty: Kissinger McLarty Associates, and numerous other Energy and foreign policy experts.

The findings of this Task Force were forwarded to Dick Cheney’s energy Task Force and were used as a basis for many of it’s recommendations. The central theme of the report can be summed up by this passage:

“It is vital for the United States to assure stable and transparent international energy markets that provide prices which foster economic growth. It is also in the strategic interest of the United States to assure that appropriate national and international mechanisms are in place to prevent disruptions in energy supplies where possible, and to manage efficiently and equitably any disruption that might occur. To this end, the United States should promote a global network of arrangements that protects against disruption, while securing equitable mechanisms for burden-sharing if required”.

“For energy policy to be integrated with overall economic policy, environmental policy, and foreign policy, it needs to be vetted and articulated through a "permanent" interagency process that brings those responsible for these areas together. The Bush administration has moved rapidly in this direction through the creation of the White House Energy Policy Development Group headed by Vice President Dick Cheney. That group appropriately includes representations from the Departments of Energy, Interior, Commerce, Treasury, and State as well as representation from the Environmental Protection Agency and the FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency). As this process unfolds, the administration should find ways to establish a permanent framework for articulating energy policy, perhaps including representation from the Department of Defense as well.”

There were numerous recommendations concerning the Gulf Region and Iraq in particular including:

"Iraq remains a destabilizing influence to U.S. allies in the Middle East, as well as to regional and global order, and to the flow of oil to international markets from the Middle East. Saddam Hussein has also demonstrated a willingness to threaten to use the oil weapon and to use his own export program to manipulate oil markets. This would display his personal power, enhance his image as a "Pan Arab" leader supporting the Palestinians against Israel, and pressure others for a lifting of economic sanctions against his regime.

The United States should conduct an immediate policy review toward Iraq, including military, energy, economic, and political/diplomatic assessments."
Baker Institute, Strategic Energy Policy Challenges for the 21st Century, published 04-10-2001

Tommy Franks, testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, said the command stands ready to protect American vital interests throughout the Central Command area of responsibility.

The key to the Central Command area is to maintain
uninterrupted access to energy resources. The Persian Gulf region contains roughly 68 percent of the world's known oil and natural gas reserves - "more than 40 percent of which pass through the Strait of Hormuz," Franks said.

"And so, one of our responsibilities - in fact, one of our objectives - is to maintain access to these energy resources at the same time that we maintain access to markets in the region," he remarked.
Dept of Defense - American Forces Press Service, published 04-13-2001

THE AMERICAN administration is considering an about-turn on the sanctions in force against three so-called "rogue nations" - Iraq, Iran and Libya - to increase supplies of energy to consumers. The move, which is likely to face opposition from several quarters, is one of the proposals made in the draft report of the energy task force set up by President George Bush and chaired by his deputy, Vice-President Dick Cheney.

A key sentence of the draft, obtained by Reuters news agency, says: "The administration will initiate a comprehensive sanctions review and seek to engage the Congress in a partnership for sanctions reform." Mr Cheney's committee has been meeting amid great secrecy for the past six weeks in an effort to devise a long-term national energy policy that would safeguard oil and gas supplies to the United States. It is due to report in four weeks' time.
The Independent, published 04-19-2001

"The Bush administration is seriously considering supporting an Iraqi insurgency group and fomenting a military coup to topple Saddam Hussein, United Press International learned exclusively Friday.

These options are set out in a report written earlier this month by Richard Haass, the head of the Bush administration's interagency working group on Iraq policy. Haass recommended backing an uprising by a popular rebel group, while simultaneously recruiting and supporting high-ranking Iraqi military officers willing to oust Saddam's regime, according to administration officials who have seen Haass' memo and described its contents to UPI."
United Press International, published 04-28-2001

Wolfowitz turned to me. "You give [Osama] bin Laden too much credit. He could not do all these things like the 1993 attack on New York, not without a state sponsor. Just because FBI and CIA have failed to find the linkages does not mean they don't exist." I could hardly believe it, but Wolfowitz was actually spouting the totally discredited Laurie Mylroie theory that Iraq was behind the 1993 truck bomb at the World Trade Center, a theory that had been investigated for years and found to be totally untrue.
Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies, p. 231, published 03-01-2004

"Iraq planned and sponsored international terrorism in 2000. Although Baghdad focused on antidissident activity overseas, the regime continued to support various terrorist groups. The regime has not attempted an anti-Western terrorist attack since its failed plot to assassinate former President Bush in 1993 in Kuwait.

Several expatriate terrorist groups continued to maintain offices in Baghdad, including the Arab Liberation Front, the inactive 15 May Organization, the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and the Abu Nidal organization (ANO). PLF leader Abu Abbas appeared on state-controlled television in the fall to praise Iraq's leadership in rallying Arab opposition to Israeli violence against Palestinians. The ANO threatened to attack Austrian interests unless several million dollars in a frozen ANO account in a Vienna bank were turned over to the group.

The Iraq-supported Iranian terrorist group, Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), regularly claimed responsibility for armed incursions into Iran that targeted police and military outposts, as well as for mortar and bomb attacks on security organization headquarters in various Iranian cities. MEK publicists reported that in March group members killed an Iranian colonel having intelligence responsibilities. An MEK claim to have wounded a general was denied by the Iranian Government. The Iraqi regime deployed MEK forces against its domestic opponents."
State Dept - "Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism", published 04-30-2001

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and I'm very pleased to be here to here to participate in the rollout of "Patterns of Global Terrorism" annual report. ...

These successes mean that we are achieving the basic objectives of the United States counter-terrorism strategy -- isolation of countries and groups that support terrorism, disruption of terrorist planning and operations, sharing of information, and the apprehension and trial of perpetrators. These objectives are shared by many of our partners throughout the world. ...

The results are clear: state sponsors of terrorism are increasingly isolated; terrorist groups are under growing pressure; terrorists are being brought to justice. We will not let up.
US State Department, published 04-30-2001

When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the world joined forces to turn him back. But the international community would have faced a very different situation had Hussein been able to blackmail with nuclear weapons. Like Saddam Hussein, some of today's tyrants are gripped by an implacable hatred of the United States of America. They hate our friends, they hate our values, they hate democracy and freedom and individual liberty. Many care little for the lives of their own people. In such a world, Cold War deterrence is no longer enough. ...

We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation.
Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University, published 05-01-2001

Not long ago I spoke to the American Turkish Council and I took a bold risk, reciting an old Turkish saying in Turkish, a feat that I won't attempt for you today. I'll do it in English. The saying goes, "bad news comes back, even from Baghdad." Ten years after the Gulf War we're still getting bad news from Baghdad, from the same tyrannical regime. This regime which has meant bad news for so many for so long poses one of today's most pressing obstacles to peace. It has become clear that there is no cost-free or risk-free option in dealing with that regime.

We must see Saddam without illusion if we are to know how to deal with the dangers that he creates. We cannot appease him. His appetites cannot be satisfied. There will be no peace in the region and no safety for our friends there--Arabs or Israelis, Kurds or Turkamons--as long as he remains in power. ...

As Secretary of State Powell has said, "Saddam Hussein is sitting on a failed regime that is not going to be around in a few years' time. The world," Secretary Powell said, "is going to leave him behind and his regime behind as the world marches to new drummers, drummers of democracy and of free enterprise." And let me add to that, it is our obligation to help this forward march in every way that we can. ...

Today the tyrannical regime in Baghdad is the root ca